ABSTRACT This Special Issue questions a basic assumption in thinking about morality: the idea that the explicit articulation of moral commitments that usually remain implicit is the basis par excellence for dialogue and rapprochement between people of opposing views. Nicholas Adams shows in the main article of this Special Issue that there is a paradox behind this assumption concerning ethics itself: articulating moral commitments may end up undermining them. It inherently stands in tension with forms of life as people actually inhabit them. Adams associates this basic paradox of ethics with the problem of forced articulation in particular discursive regimes, such as interreligious dialogue. The practice of Scriptural Reasoning is introduced as an alternative mode of dialogue that is less vulnerable to the distortions of articulation. The five response articles (by Petruschka Schaafsma, Ariën Voogt, Rob Compaijen, Dominique Gosewisch, and Sophia Höff) address aspects of Adams’ challenge to articulation in relation to morality, rather than the setting of interreligious engagement. They point out the value of articulation in spite of its inherent imperfection, or constructively elaborate on how to deal with the paradox of ethics as analyzed by Adams. Finally, Adams responds by addressing the concerns of these replies.

ABSTRACT In response to Adam’s concern that when one tries to articulate a moral commitment, the commitment is ‘falsified,’ I examine the importance of a particular articulation in the process of moral development and look for a way to engage in this articulation, while avoiding the pitfalls Adams identified. Via the example of moral formation, and more specifically, exemplarity, I show the role of articulation in moral growth. Moreover, I attempt to show that partial and imperfect articulation can lead to moral growth. For if this articulation is understood as inherently partial, it does not fall into the pitfall of ‘falsification,’ nor other well-known pitfalls in the process of moral formation through exemplarity.

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to confront a well-known problem in interreligious engagement in European institutions, namely the tendency to exclude contributions that do not conform to certain European expectations. It diagnoses problems produced not only by the problem but by certain solutions to it, and to propose in outline an alternative approach. Chief among these problems is the imperative that members of traditions articulate their deepest moral commitments, in order to secure a common moral ground. This imperative has the unintended but drastic effect of excluding important voices in dialogue. Drawing on the figures of Cordelia (in Shakespeare’s King Lear) and Antigone (in Sophocles’ Antigone) it is argued that forced articulation distorts its objects. The theoretical framework of discussion is drawn from Hegel, Schelling, and Adorno as in interpreted by Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Andrew Bowie. The originality of the argument is the use of aesthetic theory in German philosophy to inform a critique of attempts to make morality central to interreligious engagement.

ABSTRACT Five authors have written a response to my article ‘Obstacles to Moral Articulation in Interreligious Engagement’. I here summarise their responses and offer a thematically arranged response.

ABSTRACT Nicholas Adams argues that one should not force the articulation of moral common ground as this might lead to a distortion or collapse of what is being articulated. Instead, one should strive for an articulation as practised in Scriptural Reasoning, where the common ground remains implicit and interwoven with contextual understandings. These arguments concern the question of what language can do. Following Walter Benjamin, I would like to link the question of what language can or cannot do more closely to an analysis of what language is. Referring to a certain potential of language, I will argue with Benjamin that linguistic creations can serve the value of Scriptural Reasoning to engage in a fruitful conversation about moral matters. In this context, I will consider the question of whether only sacred texts are suitable for Scriptural Reasoning.

ABSTRACT In this contribution, I take Nicholas Adams’ discussion of the paradox of ethics as an occasion to further explore our present moral situation and the possibilities of ethics in it. This situation is characterised by pluralism of moral views, which gives rise to relativist and cynical reactions as well as to strong, polarising expressions. These tendencies feed a suspicion towards ethical reflection. In light of the paradox of ethics as discussed by Adams this may seem justified. I will argue, however, for a more constructive role for ethics. This can be elaborated by focusing on the transcendent character of the good, which is implied in the paradox. I will explore this transcendent character by turning to a Christian perspective on morality that elaborates this transcendence in a specific constructive way. From this perspective, the experience of the loss of self-evidence around which the paradox of ethics revolves may be seen as beneficial. It opens human beings to a transcendent good to which they can entrust themselves for a renewal of life. Thus, the good can be seen as something that makes an appeal to us that can liberate to a love that transcends doing good as a human project.

ABSTRACT This article responds to Nicholas Adams by exploring the affinities between his account and Hegel, with a particular focus on the dialectic of articulation. They seem to agree on the undermining effect of articulation and reflection on implicit commitments. However, Adams diverges from Hegel by questioning the consequence and supposed inevitability of this dialectical process. Whereas Hegel argues for the desirability of conscious articulation in the progress towards modernity, Adams contends that it is actually a destructive and oppressive process, challenging Hegel’s Enlightenment optimism and Eurocentrism. Still, I suggest that Hegel’s concern for rational dialogue as an indispensable condition for modern life and community should be taken seriously. Scriptural reasoning, as discussed by Adams, provides a model how we can have a form of rational dialogue that escapes from the dilemma posed by the Hegelian dialectic, and that it may be possible to combine strong ethical commitments with an openness to pluralistic dialogue.

ABSTRACT On the view that Nicholas Adams advocates in ‘Alternatives to Moral Common Ground’, ethics is complicit in undermining the commitments that constitute our moral lives, because by forcing us to articulate those commitments they lose their hold on us. In this paper I take Adams’ views as a starting point to explore the idea that ethics might be complicit in undermining our moral lives. Aiming to shed light on the relation between reflection and commitment, I will do two things. First, I try to explain why ethics, as a reflective enterprise, undermines the unspoken hold our commitments have on us. Second, I will explore the idea that reflection is destructive in the sense that it falsifies our pre-reflective commitments.

ABSTRACT This paper explores the structural similarities between Hegel’s conception of spirit and the Jewish medieval text, the Zohar’s, figuration of Shekhinah. The formal logic of spirit’s self-actualization is historically exemplified by Shekhinah in her existence as divinity’s indwelling presence in the world and her mythic embodiment of Jewish history. This study reads Shekhinah’s journey towards union with God as analogous to spirit’s passage towards absolute knowledge, a passage which concludes with what is often referred to as spirit’s ‘return to its elf.’ Contrary to some popular interpretations of Hegel, spirit’s return is an iterative, tautological return to itself as differentiated in itself. The discussion concludes with the claim that Shekhinah’s eschatological journey towards harmonious reunion with God occurs through a proleptic movement in which biblical past and prophesied future, or the Jews’s historically first and theoretically final redemption from exile, coalesce in a here and now in a similarly iterative manner which precludes it from a determinate, apocalyptic end.

ABSTRACT While many scholars have realized that the Enlightenment period was much more religious than previously thought, the deists are still seen as basically secular figures who believed in a distant and inactive deity. This article shows that the hundred and thirteen French Revolutionary deists who wrote prayers and hymns to God believed in a caring, loving, and active deity. They maintained that God wanted people to be free, and so God actively helped the French Revolution by leading the French armies to victory and revealing enemy plots. The majority of these prayers and hymns were said at government-sponsored religious festivals. It is a mistake, however, to dismiss this religious language as being about sacralizing the new nation. Instead, there were places in the festivals where individuals could express their own religious views. Furthermore, most of these prayers and hymns were written while Maximilien Robespierre was pushing his deist civil religion and labelling irreligious people as enemies of the French republic. However, the same views about God were expressed after his death by the Theophilanthropists. Thus, these deists were not merely echoing the party line while Robespierre was alive, but were expressing their true religious feelings.